Being John Malkovitch?

“Two hundred dollars for fifteen minutes in John Malkovitch’s mind” this is the gist of the film Being John Malkovitch. It all starts when struggling puppeteer Craig Schwartz (John Cusack) and his wife Lotte (Cameron Diaz) decide it’s time for Craig to put get a “real” job. After searching the paper he finds an advertisement for a filing clerk. He quickly accepts the job and in a matter of weeks finds a portal in the back of the office behind a cabinet. This portal takes its explorer into the mind of John Malkovitch. Everything John Malkovitch sees, hears, is participated in by its patron. The catch is, after fifteen minutes the participant is ejected from Malkovitch’s mind.
Some ways into the film, Craig, in an attempt to woo over the vivacious Maxine Lund (Catherine keener), uses his puppeteering expertise to retain control of Malkovitch’s mind and body permanently. Essentially, his body becomes nothing more than a vessel for Craig and Malkovitch’s original persona is trapped in his own subconscious. At this point we start to see the way the topic of the week fits into the film. We are watching a movie about a puppeteer controlling another human as a puppet while being controlled through psychological and emotional manipulation by Maxine.
What is particularly relevant to this week’s material is the way that the characters in the film are able to jump between controlling Malkovitch and merely experiencing events through his body. For the majority of patrons that enter the vessel, this type of mutiny is impossible. When those who can control Malkovitch are in control, Malkovitch is forced into his own subconscious and becomes a spectator in his own body. This is where things get philosophically interesting.
Frankfurt’s agenda in the essay for this week makes a distinction between humans and animals by way of their free will. Specifically by appeal to what he titles, first order desires and second order desires. First order desires are characterized by the ability to choose to do one thing or another. These are desires had by animals and humans alike. Second order desires take the concept of choosing to do one thing or another a bit farther adding to it a self-reflexive component that causes the actor to question if they want to act at all.
In addition to second order desires, there is second order volition. This adds to the concept of second order desires the will to carry out those desires. This distinction between the person who knows what they want to do and does it, and the person who knows what they want to do but cannot or does not do it is what leads Frankfort to distinguish between the man and the "wanton". The key difference between the man and the wanton, Frankfort claims, is the ability for one to turn their thought back on their self in order to determine ones needs. Thus, Frankfort defines what it means to be human in a creatures ability to will itself.
This is particularly interesting in light of Being John Malkovitch. This is because in light of all the levels of control in the film, based on Frankfort's definition of volition, who is a rational being and who is not? First and foremost, Malkovitch himself is not a rational agent for a majority of the movie. He is mostly trapped in his own body, against his will, and is unable to escape the domineering presence of Craig. This would make it seem like Craig is in fact a rational being for the reason that he is able to control Malkovitch for most of the film and bring to volition his own desires. However at the end of the film when he is trapped inside of the subconscious of a child he ceases to be a rational animal. I think it's fair to say that the only person through out the entire length of the film whom Frankfort would classify as a person is Maxine. She is the only person who consistently exerts her will in the entirety of the movie.
What Being John Malkovitch points out rather nicely in Frankfort's definition of personhood, is how dangerously fluid the concept is. As we see many times through out the film, some characters are able to will their secondary desires at times and then at others are not. This is problematic. If it is the case that a person is defined by their ability to bring their second order desires into actuality, then what happens when that ceases to become the case? Does that agent cease to become a person? Likewise, do they regain that personhood when they bring their will into fruition?I for one cannot abide this sporadic notion of personhood for the reason this film points out, simply put is chaotic.